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REBUILDING IRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH IRAQI NATIONALS
While insisting upon the firm adherence to the course delineated by existing Allied policy and directive, it is my purpose to continue to advance the transition just as rapidly as you are able to assume the attending autonomous responsibility.
General Douglas MacArthur, message to the people of Japan, 1949
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) accomplished one its major objectives, the removal of the Sadaam Hussein regime. However, in Phase IV, Stability Operations, it is still in pursuit of winning and securing the peace. Grasping this objective is proving to be a far more daunting challenge as attacks on U.S. and coalition forces occur almost daily. The enemy, now termed an insurgent, has laid many obstacles along the path of the country's efforts, from shoulder launched missiles to the infinite number of explosive devices and mines strewn throughout the countryside. Subsequently, the U.S. led coalition is engaged in a relentless battle to root out and eliminate stubborn enemy forces opposed to a peaceful Iraq.
When peace has been attained it must be maintained. A key component to maintaining peace will be the use and employment of Iraqi nationals instead of contractors from outside the country to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure. The U.S. must take the lead in this effort, breaking from its traditional relationship with contractors such as Halliburton and Bechtel and, equally important, garnering sufficient coalition support to maintain this endeavor.
This paper contends that organizational changes are needed at the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DOS) in conjunction with Non-Governmental
Agencies (NGOs) that will accelerate and expand the involvement of Iraqi nationals in the rebuilding of their country. Additionally, the Iraqi people will be closely examined in the context of their history, culture and religion. Parallels will be drawn between the Iraqi and African
American labor during the U.S. Civil War and Reconstruction periods.
THE IRAQI PEOPLE, RELIGION AND HISTORY
The Iraqis are proud, hard working people forged by their history. Their survivability, perseverance and endurance make them more than capable of rebuilding their nation. They have a rich, diverse culture and background made up of equally diverse peoples living in different regions of the country. For the Iraqi, religion is far more than a casual observance.
They are deeply committed to their religion and to such an extent, their faith regulates daily life.
The Islamic religion is based on submitting to the will of God or "Allah" and it governs everything from government, social life, crime, punishment to mortality and the after life. The actions of each family member impacts significantly, particularly on the family's reputation.
The father is the head of the family. He usually brings home the most money and the wife rarely
works. An Arab's first loyalty is to the family. Many families are large and close-knit.
Maintenance of the family honor is one of the highest values among the Arabic Iraqi people.
It is this honor that is revered and cherished above anything else, occasionally even survival itself. 3 Criticism, no matter how constructive, is usually as damaging to the Arab's honor and it is seen as a personal insult. The Arab must, above all else, shield himself and his honor from this critical onslaught.
Iraqi diversity helped them become a strong and resilient people who overcame numerous adversities throughout their history. Most notably is the succession of plagues, famines and floods that date back to the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 5 The grasping of ideas and technology shaped Iraq's ability to rebuild itself; an ability it has done well throughout history.
In the early twentieth century, Iraq greatly added to its existing educational facilities, subsequently adding to the ranks of the new middle class, the natural carrier of national sentiment. In the years that followed, Iraq's ruling class focused on nurturing in the schools patriotism and active sympathy for Arab ideals. However, in the time of King Faisal I, 1921 -1933, the focus of the ruling class was the difficult task of cultivating a common purpose and feeling among Iraq's diverse populations. King Faisal maintained in a confidential memorandum, "there is still and I say this with a heart full of sorrow, no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever. Out of these masses we want to fashion a people which we would train, educate and refine. The circumstances, being what they are, the immenseness of the efforts needed for this can be imagined". King Faisal went out of his way to associate with the Shi'is by easing their admission into government service and putting promising young Shi'is through an accelerated training program and affording them opportunities to rise rapidly in positions of responsibility.
training programs but more importantly, gave the Iraqi worker a voice to express concerns over working conditions and wages. Many workers were abused as Iraqi growth and technological development continued on a rapid pace, particularly in the twentieth century. The Artisans, Association founded in 1929, catered to handicraft workers and petty tradesmen.
11 It was sensitive to the working conditions and their grievances but gave priority to the national worker in general. 12 Iraq's labor unions were fairly successful. Worker skill improved and abuse abated. Like their Western counterparts, worker rights were at least heard and attempts were made to improve conditions. The Iraqi worker forged ahead and did so with pride. Handwritten proclamations written long hand appeared in eighteen locations in the town of Nasiriyyah on 13
December 1932. 13 The proclamation bore the watchwords, "workers of the world unite!" "Long live the union of workers and peasants republic of the Arab Countries!" The proclamation captured the spirit and essence of the Iraqi worker.
RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY
Iraq reconstruction has been frustrating for U.S. and Iraq officials. The United States perceives that the Iraqi Governing Council, a key player in Iraq's reconstruction and political future, is slow and indecisive. 14 Defeating the daily asymmetric obstacles and frustrations requires mental and physical agility at every level.
Modifications to the reconstruction strategy should be made in four areas. These modifications will echo the National Security Strategy (NSS) that treats global engagement and post-conflict operations with the same importance as preemption strategy.
Keeping and securing the peace is thus just as critical as going to war for it. The National Military Strategy which derives its overall security policy guidance from the NSS will adjust accordingly, as it defines the national military objectives and establishes the strategy to accomplish the military objectives to meet the engagement strategy. For example, to meet the the renewed engagement strategy, adjustments to the U.S. Army, active duty and reserves, should be made to bring the majority of the Civil Affairs soldiers back on active duty. The pool of linguists and related specialties will have to increase to meet the demands of an engagement strategy. Although the CPA is currently not aligned under OSD, it is a new organization that works directly for the Secretary of Defense. It is in charge of Iraq's reconstruction efforts.
However, it underwent two leadership changes within 12 months and has experienced some personnel instability. Contractors in Iraq complain that the CPA's staff consists primarily of political appointees who do not understand the process. 15 Privately, some CPA officials acknowledge the staff is less than the best the U.S. has to offer. One official admits to working with the C-team or third string players. 16 Aligning the CPA under the OSD gives it a stable foothold in the DoD where it can draw on valuable advice, experience and credibilityingredients that are pivotal to the CPA as it reaches out to Iraq's Governing Council.
The U.S. should carefully hand pick a Governing Council for the reconstruction planning process during Phase I of the campaign planning process. The Governing Council's main focus must be on reconstruction. Thus, they should be in place long before decisive operations begin.
Unlike during OIF when they were not included in the planning process, members of the Governing Council must be invited to be active participants in the planning effort led by the The 27 The CMIS forged and sharpened from U.S. experiences in Rwanda and Somalia would operate at the strategic and operational level. The U.N. and U.S. led coalition should co-lead the CMIS in the transition from conflict to post conflict operations. Once peace is maintained, command and control should be passed to the head of the CPA. These levels of supervision provide the appropriate civilian and military authority mix and structure to get the rebuilding effort off the ground. However, it is essential that the U.S., its military and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) understand each other's role and collaborate effectively.
The CMIS consists of many diverse organizations, skills, capabilities and ideas. Unlike military organizations, it is not as rigidly organized with a supporting hierarchy. Moreover, this diversity makes it difficult to manage rebuilding efforts, particularly right after crises situations.
But it is this very diversity that is fundamental to the capability of what the CMIS can leverage.
To overcome this challenge, the transition of command and control should not be too sudden or
sweeping. An appropriate mix of military and civilian should remain so that any unforeseen crises that might arise are handled swiftly by the military. months. 34 In the build institutions phase, Iraqi nationals with lessening assistance from CMIS begin to rebuild their country. Job programs and investment programs will be started to facilitate the reconstruction efforts, laying a foundation for a new Iraq. 35 This phase should last 12 -24 months. 36 In the handover -redeploy phase, the handover of CPA authority of CMIS functions to a free, Iraq government occurs. Additionally, transition to Iraqi's national security, police forces and civil defense corps occurs. All coalition forces redeploy and the U.S. Embassy monitors the country's governance and operations. The last phase lasts 1-2 years. 37 Phasing will ensure coordination across all organizations occurs and that no critical function is overlooked. This process will also alert organization representatives of any major shortfalls ahead of time.
A comprehensive vetting process will identify reliable, trustworthy Iraqis. However, before the vetting of the Iraqi population by the USAID, the Iraqi Governing Council must be vetted first.
The CPA, augmented by the OSD and State Department would lead this vetting. Vetting should be an exclusive responsibility for the CPA. It is the first and most important step in the rebuilding process and should not be delegated to any other agency or organization.
Specifically, it starts from the Governing Council down through the Baathist and Tribal leaders.
Its purpose is to further dismantle remnants of the Hussein regime while retaining the skills of Once vetted, a capable contractor such as Kellog, Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, would take the lead and conduct training. Training will focus, as much as possible, on Iraq's indigenous capacities and center on a hands-on methodology. The training program will not need to start from scratch. For decades, Iraq's large professional classes have furnished Bagdad with relatively efficient and skilled bureaucrats and technicians and, while many have been forced to drive taxis, they are waiting to return to their prior occupations. 40 When sufficient Iraqis are trained and can demonstrate skilled and sustained proficiency over a limited period of time, the contractor mission will be complete. However, contracting representatives should check on and assess the progress of major projects. Progress would be tied to measurable standards that are understood by contracting representatives and Iraqi nationals in the second phase of CMIS' three phase operation, build institutions.
Initially, the training program would target quick impact projects such as, housing and public facilities at the community level and then move to larger ones such as, major roads, highways, water treatment, public works and the electrical grid system. Progress will be important and energies will be focused on highly visible projects. Smaller, community projects could average $25,000 -$50,000 and these funds could be channeled directly into communities once local citizens have been organized to prioritized their reconstruction requests. 41 The hands-on methodology will help lay the foundation of local elections and civil society development and ultimately could point the country to a free democracy. In Kosovo and
Afghanistan such projects were useful in developing a new political class and renewed sense of citizen responsibility.
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Early divestiture of contracting organizations like Halliburton is necessary for two reasons.
One, it fosters Iraqi independence, self governance and stability without the sense of too much Western involvement. Two, it is arguably less expensive in the long term to train local nationals than depending on an external source of labor. Although Brown and Root's support in the Balkans is an efficient operation, since December 1995, the Army has spent $546.6 million for services supporting peacekeeping operations. 43 The cost savings from using Iraqi nationals could significantly contribute to the country's reconstruction or the U.S. led Global War on Terrorism. Their labor would also help prevent the conditions of overcharging or waste by contractors. The U.S. construction giant Bechtel has the prime contract worth about $1 billion for restoring Iraq's infrastructure. 44 The employment of some Iraqis by Bechtel does very little in off-setting the cost. However, the CPA's capability of exclusively hiring Iraqis through its CMIS organization, can significantly off-set the costs. The cost savings would be realized in phase two, build institutions. In many cases the black laborer in some cases outworked their white counterparts. A
HISTORICAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN IRAQIS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS
Confederate soldier stationed at Gloucester Point in May 1861 marveled at the sight of one white engineer officer supervising sixty blacks and commented that "they had already accomplished a good deal" and could easily put up breastworks faster than any number of whites. 49 Southern free blacks proved to be so industrious they posed serious labor competition for whites in the Summer 1861. 50 However, Representatives never allowed black labor to compete with white labor. Representative William Richardson from Ohio insisted that "God made the white man superior to the black and legislation will undo or change the decrees of
Heaven." 51 Moreover, southern legislators accustomed to inexpensive black labor and fearful of autonomous migration, passed laws to restrict black movement. Enticement laws, enacted in most states before 1890, prohibited one employer from hiring an employee or sharecropper under contract to or in the employment of another.
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Adverse and austere working conditions tested the black laborer further. They were frequently afforded minimal shade from the hot sun in the Summer and cold wind in the Winter.
Technology had not developed central heating or air, which exasperated the problem.
Exposure to these conditions contributed to many illnesses and diseases that black laborers and their families had to endure and overcome.
The black laborer, like the Iraqi, was steeped in his faith and religion. Many blacks, not too far removed from slavery, found escape, emotional release and solace from the injustices of everyday life. However, religion believed and practiced by slaves was paradoxical. Christianity urged resistance to oppression in the Old Testament but taught acceptance of fate and obedience in the New Testament. 53 Faith provided the surreptitious development of black intelligentsia (preachers, ministers, deacons) and a sense of community in a hostile society. 54 Their faith provided spiritual nourishment, which evolved into songs. In these spirituals blacks sang about the end of injustices and a better working environments.
The Iraqi people are proud, reliable and resilient. They share a uniquely common linkage with the African American laborer and his struggles. The Iraqi and the African American grew from unimaginable masses of human beings devoid any patriotic idea or loyalty to their country, whether to Iraq or the U.S. Both were refined, honed and strengthened by history, culture and religion. Both know how to overcome near insurmountable challenges and injustices. Both also know how to work and what they are capable of producing. Given the opportunity, they can achieve unmatched work efficiencies and quality that rival external sources and the counterparts they serve. If given the opportunity, just like African Americans were given to help rebuild the U.S. following the Civil War, Iraqis will demonstrate that they are more than capable for the tasks, thereby minimizing needs for profit seeking, capitalistic contractors.
CONTRACTING PITFALLS
In the Civil War, equipment, uniforms and weapons were often cheaply made for profit by hungry government contractors and of substandard quality, which contributed more to the suffering of soldiers in the field. 55 Unfair practices of contractors and business continued throughout the post-Civil War period. In the late nineteenth century, the preoccupation with the grosser inequities of American life, freedom seemed to many reformers tainted by the freedom of predatory capitalists to exploit their fellow citizens. 56 The Civil War practice of denying the labor competition equal access, could be repeating itself in the Iraqi reconstruction with the swift awarding of contracts to Haliburton and Bechtel.
There is no evidence to suggest that these contracting giants conducted any early training or transitioning with local nationals upon their arrival in the country that could have set the conditions for large employment of Iraqi laborers. Quite the opposite appears to be occurring.
There is a lucrative temptation for some contracting companies in Iraq to overcharge for their services. The lawless conditions in Iraq make this practice a fairly easy temptation to slip into. Usually, companies are barred from excessive payments and kickbacks by law.
Halliburton a chief U.S. contractor, under intense scrutiny for its connections to Vice President Cheney, is accused of gouging prices on imported fuel -charging $1.59 a gallon to import nearly $200 million gallons of gasoline. 57 SOMO, the Iraqi national oil company, stated it can purchase the same fuel at no higher than 98 cents a gallon. 58 Others question why Iraqis are not allowed to bring in their own fuel rather than external companies like Halliburton. years. 60 Balance is critical to successful reconstruction particularly for Iraq that experienced 30 years of totalitarian rule. 61 Post war Iraq mandates the same, if not more careful planning and execution in order for the U.S. to win and maintain the peace. Adjusting a strategy that fosters greater involvement by the local nationals to rebuild their own country has the potential to lead it quicker to a free, self governing democracy. Particularly if the affected country perceives outside assistance as comprehensive, result oriented and relatively short in duration. Evidence in this paper leads to this conclusion.
The U.S. needs to resist the immediate urge to turn to its contract giants exclusively.
Instead, leverage their capabilities to accelerate the rebuilding efforts of Iraqi industries such as SOMO, the country's national oil company. When Iraq starts to get back on its feet, the U.S.
and coalition forces need to pull out to give Iraq the space it will need to try its new wings of freedom. The Iraqi people are very resilient, competent and capable. Subsequently, the coalition and its partners cannot give Iraq the impression that its space is being micromanaged or crowded. Thus, the U.S. peacekeeping strategy must continue to train rebuilding nations, but now must stress an early redeployment or departure and leave behind a minimum footprint, such as a U.S. Embassy. Most importantly, the U.S. must thoroughly articulate its new peacekeeping strategy to the world. Allied or coalition support must be accomplished upfront, well before the start of any U.S. led operations or regime change. Although it is probably not as expensive rebuilding Iraq with its own population in the long term, considerable resources will be required at the onset -costs that U.S. cannot bear alone.
The revised strategy will ultimately pave the way to a smooth reconstruction that includes active participation by all parties and ultimately, self governance.
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